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Abstract
This thesis reviews the major theoretical frameworks and their outlook on the
government spending, its effectiveness, the implied size of the multiplier and how they
differed in empirical studies. This is followed by an estimation of the government
multiplier for the major U.S. fiscal policy, namely the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), after the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Own estimation of
the size of the multiplier is presented using a standard SVAR model based on New
Keynesian approach for time period between 2009 and 2018. In addition, following the
classical economic theory, the multiplier is recalculated in the absence of Finance,
Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE) sector which is considered to be unproductive sector
since it does not add value according to the classical theory. I find the multiplier to be
below unity during this period with the exception when the FIRE industries are excluded.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In recent days, the government spending multiplier got into the spotlight of the
economists and the general public. The Great Recession in the late 2000s proved to be the
accelerator for research and interest in this topic as with monetary policy being
constrained by zero interest rates, policymakers decided to turn to the fiscal policy to
fine-tune the economy. This action, however, was not without its controversy as a share
of the politicians, economists and the general public found an expansive fiscal policy to
be adverse to the economy. The main disagreement was about whether the government
spending multiplier is higher than unity or not. To resolve this issue, many economists
decided to estimate the size of the multiplier; however, their efforts never really helped to
settle this problem. The results showed a wide range of estimates that would vary from
high multipliers, larger than 2, to multipliers close to zero. This heterogeneity is the result
of the complexity of the multiplier as there are many variables that affect it such as the
state of the economy, the type of the spending shock or the methodology and assumptions
that were used. A better understanding of this topic and a general agreement on how
fiscal policy should be enacted would help with a more efficient and effective
government spending that would not only save taxpayers' money but would also have the
ability to support the economy, reduce the harm of downturns and keep the economy
longer on track of expansion.
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The idea of the government spending multiplier started back in the 19 th century;
however, the generally accepted originator of this concept was John Maynard Keynes.
Keynes, through his general framework, claimed that government spending is beneficial
as people behave and spend their money based on their current income. Such a
conclusion leads to a higher multiplier. Keynes found a lot of opponents, especially after
the Second World War, who claimed that people behave on a rational basis and therefore
will use this additional spending for future purposes, be it future tax expenditure or to
smooth their consumption. This dilemma led economists to test this on real-life data and
see the size of the multiplier for themselves. Despite that, there is no consensus on the
horizon due to the complexity of this topic and the fact that there is more than just
multiplier.
In my undergraduate thesis (Focht, 2016), I analyzed the size of the multiplier
from a mainstream perspective by using the model first introduced to the
macroeconomics sphere by Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017) and Ramey and Zubairy
(2018). By applying Jorda’s local projections model along with defense spending as the
shock variable, I estimate the multipliers over three different states of the economy;
expansion, recession, and Zero Lower Bound. I found the multipliers to be constant and
lower than unity. In this work, I aim to use the knowledge about alternate frameworks
gained from my graduate studies and compare them with more traditional framework,
how they compare, where they differ, and how their assumptions and methodologies
affect the size of the multiplier. Secondly, the Great Recession was started by a crisis
inside the FIRE sector 1, therefore, I decided to use the work by Duncan Foley (2011) and
1

FIRE industries = Finance, Insurance, Real Estate Industries
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test the new Keynesian theories with a twist by employing a classical-Keynesian
approach and excluding the FIRE sector to estimate the size of the multiplier. After the
crash of 2008, Foley made estimates of by how much the GDP should fall and how high
the unemployment should get. Later he found, that the drop in output was not as severe as
he predicted, however, he was fairly correct when it came to the unemployment rate,
therefore, he asked himself a question why that was so. Foley used a classical-Keynesian
approach, going back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo and their differentiation
between “productive” and “unproductive” labor and Marx’s “surplus value”, to answer
this question by dividing the economy into two sectors; the FIRE sector (as unproductive
sector of the economy) and the rest of the economy (as productive). The reason why did
so was twofold. First, FIRE is considered an unproductive sector of the economy in the
classical sense, that is, it does not create or add value. Second, related to the first point,
the issue of “imputation”. Foley realized that the FIRE sector is handled differently when
it comes to the calculation of the GDP as there are no independent measures of the value
added by these industries ( for other industries, it is the revenue from sales minus the cost
of purchased inputs excluding new investment and labor). On the contrary, the national
accounts impute the value added by in the FIRE sector by equaling it to the income
generated. Also, as Foley shows, the national accounts consider the difference between
interest received and interest paid by the FIRE industries as a value added by them, which
increased due to the monetary easing during the Great Recession. He finds the imputation
not to be an accurate representation of the value added as there is a weaker relationship
between employment and value added, between sales and value added, and in general
inflates the size of the economy and its growth rate.
3

I decided to test his ideas and test how they would affect the size of the multiplier
if we looked at the industries outside of the FIRE sector. The underlying logic for the
non-FIRE multiplier is that using classical school’s measure of value added should lead
to more accurate estimates of the multiplier and the effects of fiscal policy. Secondly, as
Foley showed, the recession was more severe if FIRE is excluded, therefore, I test
whether the multiplier is higher than it would be for the entire economy in the absence of
FIRE sector. In my work, I employ the model created by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and expand it by including interest rate and the use of value added without FIRE
industries. Later, I also test two different transformations of elasticities to multipliers.
Chapter 2 contains a review of the theoretical frameworks by Keynes, Friedman,
Modigliani, Hall, and New Keynesian economists. I show the differences between their
main assumptions, policy conclusions, and the implied size of the multiplier. In Chapter
3, I create a summary of empirical research. I divide this into four sections, stateindependent multipliers, cyclical multipliers, zero lower bound multipliers, and
multipliers after the ARRA. I explain the theoretical side of how large these multipliers
should be and then make a general summary of the results. In Chapter 4, I focus on how
methodology and assumptions create a difference. First, I focus on the methodology side.
I present the two main models that are currently being used, time series and DSGE
models and show the difference in their estimations. In the assumption part, I present six
different assumptions that can affect the size of the multiplier.
In Chapter 5, I present my methodology as I use an SVAR model based on
Cholesky decomposition following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). In Chapter 6, I show
my results. I estimate my multipliers by using the model created by Blanchard and Perotti
4

(2002) and then expanding it by adding two variables, interest rate and value added
without the FIRE industries to test whether the same methodology will lead to similar
results and how excluding the FIRE industries will affect the size of the multiplier.
Chapter 7 provides a summary of empirical work with some concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks
2.1 John Maynard Keynes
Although the government spending multiplier, and fiscal multiplier in general, is
mostly related to John Maynard Keynes, one can trace its origins even further in the past.
The first substantial work on this topic can be seen in the work of an Australian
economist Alfredo De Lissa (Goodwin, 1962). In his work, De Lissa followed the
Australian economy going from the 1880s through the 1900s when Australia was going
through an expansion, and he attempted to analyze the impact of staple-producing
industries on the economy. However, the first one to bring this issue into the light of
mainstream discussion was Richard Kahn, who worked with John Maynard Keynes.
Kahn was the first one to put down a clear theoretical and analytical description of the
government spending multiplier in his work in 1931 (Kahn, 1931). Due to their close
connection and Keynes' respect for Kahn, Keynes used the basis that Kahn laid down in
his work and implemented it in his famous book The General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money (Keynes, 1936). In his work, Keynes argues that government
spending, under certain conditions, can increase the GDP by more than the sheer amount
that the government spends through the multiplication process of enhancing the national
demand. To explain this argument, Keynes also presented the well know Keynesian
consumption function and output function.
1)𝐶 = 𝐶𝑎 + 𝑀𝑃𝐶 ∗ 𝑌
6

2)𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋
Equation 1) is the consumption function where C represents consumption, Ca is
autonomous consumption (necessary consumption that is made even without any
disposable income), MPC stands for marginal propensity to consume (cents spent on a
dollar from additional disposable income), and Y is disposable income (total income
minus net taxes). MPC is also directly connected to the marginal propensity to save
(MPS) as what is not saved is spent; therefore, MPC= 1-MPS.
Equation 2) is the output (=income) function where Y stands for output, C consumption, I
is private investment, G government spending (not including transfers) and NX is net
export. An essential assumption that Keynes made was that MPC was not constant over
different levels of income in the economy. According to him, as the income grows,
people will be more prone to save a big part of their economy and therefore, MPC
decreases (MPS increases). Taking all this into consideration has significant impacts on
the economy, as Keynes saw since if consumption spending decreases, the effective
demand goes down and there is less income created in the economy which leads to
stagnation. This is where Keynes argues that government spending should step in to
stimulate the economy and increase the Y through higher government spending.
Government spending will generate an income that is multiple of the initial size of
government spending. So, a higher national income will result in higher investment and
consumption spending and will bring the economy back on track.
Concerning the multiplier, Keynes did not see the initial government spending as
having only a one-time impact, and that is where the term Keynesian multiplier
originated. Keynes understood the dynamic character of the economy and argued that
7

every spending will generate some income into the economy. As an example, he puts
forward government spending. The initial act is the government spending a certain
amount of money that will flow from the government to consumers. The consumers will
then act on as their disposable income has increased, and they will increase their
consumption and spend a part of it according to the size of their MPC. Such action will
have multiple rounds and, in the end, creates a multiplying effect. He was not worried
about a crowding out effect, which implies that government spending would not be
effective as the increased spending is financed through additional borrowing and would
increase interest rates. This in turn would lead to lower private investment and
consumption as firms would find their projects less profitable and consumers would
rather save their money due to the increased opportunity cost. He saw markets to be
imperfect where people do not behave strictly rational and see future as uncertain. This
leads to people being more prone to spending their additional income in the same period
rather than smooth their consumption over future periods that are clouded with
uncertainty (Skidelsky, 2009). There are issues with the validity of the crowding-out
effect, especially, during the years after the Great Recession when the economy was
below its potential, was facing low interest rates, and the influence of foreign savings,
however, that will be talked about in a greater detail in the following chapters.
Keynes’ understanding of this process was accepted during and in the decades
after the Great Depression as he and his ideas were generally accepted as what helped to
fight the depression. Even during his time, there were economists, mostly coming from
the Austrian school of thought such as Hayek and Mises (Bas, 2011), who disagreed with
this notion; however, first mainstream economists did not come until later who stood
8

strong opposition to his ideas. In the next section, those will be the economists and their
ideas that I will talk about.
2.2 Opposition to Keynes
Between the 1940s and 1970s, following the Great Depression and the Second
World War, Keynesian economists held the mainstream view on how the economy works
and how it should be run. In this section, I will talk about three significant opponents to
Keynes' concept of consumption function and government spending, Milton Friedman,
Franco Modigliani, and Robert Hall.
The first one to challenge Keynes' consumption function and theoretical
framework after the Second World War was Milton Friedman. Friedman used to describe
himself as a former Keynesian (Skousen, 1998), even though that was not found with
great understanding among Keynes and his followers, but then he said his ideas had
developed. He found the Keynesian consumption function as too simplistic and one
layered and decided to put forward his framework that would explain how people react to
disposable income and how their consumption changes that is now called the Permanent
Income Hypothesis (PIH) (Friedman, 1957). One of the reasons he decided to do so was
the emerging science of econometrics that allowed economists to follow the progress of
different variables through time series. Although these methods were at its early stages,
they showed that consumption is not as volatile as Keynes' consumption function would
suggest, and therefore, there should be more to it than what Keynes offered as an
explanation to the movements inside the economy. The PIH diminishes the ability of the
government to fine-tune the economy based on expectations related to long-run
considerations. Friedman introduces main features into the debate over consumption, and
9

that is adaptive rationality and perfect information. Friedman assumed that consumers are
rational beings; therefore, they will maximize their utility over the entirety of their lives
doing so by using the publicly available information about their future income, future
prices, and future interest rates. In such a framework, Friedman claims that rather than
spend their current income, people will focus on their permanent income (permanent
income could be described as the present value of average income over the lifetime) and
smooth the consumption over all periods in order to maximize their utility. Moreover,
that is what leads Friedman and Keynes to different opinions on what motivates people to
spend less or more in any given period. While Keynes claimed that current consumption
is directly linked to current income, Friedman’s framework shows that it is not the
current income that dictates current consumption, but it is the permanent income that will
determine the size of current spending. He says that people will borrow or lend money
based on whether their income is lower or higher than their permanent income and based
on whether the interest rates are currently lower or higher than they will be in the future.
It is important to point out a couple of circumstances that can alter this outcome.
According to PIH, as described by Carlin and Soskice (2007), people are
adaptive-rational. Adaptive rationality implies that consumers will act on and adapt to
new information. For example, the news of a new, one-time income will lead the
consumers to change their consumption path by including the additional income, while
anticipated changes should have no impact on consumption. An unanticipated, one-time
income will, however, increase the overall wealth of the consumer, and he will, therefore,
increase the consumption over the lifetime by the amount of the additional income.
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2005) show on the example of tax rebates that on average,
10

the households spent 20-40% of the rebate once the received the check instead of when it
was announced. They also showed that this was especially true for households with lower
wealth and income and emphasizing the impact of credit constraints, the limited ability to
borrow money. As an example, we can think of an unemployed person who does not
have savings due to the previous low income and is incapable of accessing the credit
market due to their low credit score. On the other hand, Japelli and Pistaferri (2010) show
that it is true that people do indeed respond more to permanent increases in income over
temporary ones. All in all, Carlin and Soskice find there to be three main reasons why a
simple PIH framework does not align with empirical findings (Carlin & Soskice, 2007, p.
25). The presence of credit constraints, impatience as consumers value presence over the
future and the uncertainty about future income. In such a framework, we can see a
resemblance of the Ricardian equivalence where people realize the cost of the budget
deficit and spending as it will be taxed in the future and will not increase their
consumption but rather opt for consumption-smoothing actions. This also affects business
as they will smooth their investment over time and will not increase it due to increased
government spending. Overall, it is clear to see that this framework implies that the
multiplier will be low as government spending does not have a major influence on the
actions of any of the agents. In general, the only thing that can alter their consumption is
unexpected income (transitory income) that would affect their permanent income such as
a natural disaster or war, but government spending does not fall under them, and
Friedman also assumes an expected value of zero for transitory income.
Another economist known to challenge Keynes was Franco Modigliani. His
theory is called the Life Cycle Hypothesis (1963). Modigliani's ideas do not differ
11

significantly from Friedman's, but unlike Friedman, he refers to budget constraints.
Modigliani assumes that consumers can predict their life expectancy and future income
and therefore can smooth their consumption so that in no point in their life, they are
worse or better off. Let us assume that Modigliani's representative agent is 20 and
assumes to live 60 more years. In the first 20 years, this person assumes to be making less
than their average life-long income and from 40 to 60 years old when they retire, they
will be making more money than their average income. In such case, in the first 20 years,
such agent will borrow money in order to not live under their average lifetime earnings
and wealth until their income is higher than the average income at which point, they will
spend less than they are making in order to pay back the loan and save for the retirement
when their income falls again. In such a case, one-time government spending will not
have a significant impact on their spending such consumers will either save this new
income for future tax expenditure or spread this income over the future periods. In
conclusion, similarly to Friedman, government spending will not have a high impact on
such consumers since their MPC on this new income, as Keynes would put it, will be
very small relative to Keynesian’s which leads to the multiplier being very low.
The next economist I will discuss is Robert Hall. Before talking about Hall, it is
important to look at Lucas and his critique (1976) that later Hall used in his work. Robert
Lucas came up with a criticism of the econometric models that were used back then,
when the old Keynesian approach was dominant especially after the Great Depression,
describing them as stationary, backward looking, and with adaptive (or naïve)
expectations. Lucas tried to change that by incorporating more dynamic and rational
expectations into the model where consumers do not react to new events according as
12

they would be based on the past but based on the new information that they received, and
they optimize their behavior accordingly. In the sense of econometrics, the idea was that
using one parameter for new events, let’s say additional government spending, is not
enough as the parameter is based on the past events that do not include the new
information that the agents in the economy received. Hall follows up on this work and the
work of Friedman (1957) and states that if Lucas (1976) is correct in his statement that
current consumption is based on the permanent income using rational expectation and
perfect information then any changes in relation to consumption should not be predictable
and that is why his theory is called The Random Walk Hypothesis (Hall, 1978). Hall saw,
using post-war data, that consumption does change even though consumers should be
able to smooth it, according to Friedman’s and Lucas’ theory, and ask the question why
that is so. He explains that the reason why that is so is that over their life, consumers
receive new information about their future and are forced to change their expectations
about their future income and therefore change their current consumption. Relating this
government spending, any spending that is predictable (e.g., social security) will not have
any impact on consumption. On the other hand, government spending that was not
predicted and altered consumers' expectations would affect consumers' and their
consumption. This goes hand in hand with the multiplier as unpredicted and temporary
government spending will have the capacity to increase consumption and lead to a high
multiplier.
2.3 New Keynesian Economics
The argument between traditional Keynesians and school of thoughts following
Friedman, such as the New Classical School and Monetarists led to a synthesis between
13

the two different views and caused the origins of the New Keynesian synthesis. In this
section, I will explain what this framework includes and what it implies about fiscal
policy and the size of the multiplier.
In general, Keynes was confident of the fact that the government spending
multiplier would be higher than unity and that government spending has a positive effect
on the economy through increased demand. On the other hand, the opposing argument
was that government spending is an ineffective tool as people are rational and will not
use the additional funds for immediate consumption, and therefore, the multiplier will be
low. Nevertheless, there was a feeling that neither one of the explanations captures the
entire picture, and hence, there was a push for a new framework that would be able to
combine both. New Keynesian economics takes into consideration both theories to create
a framework by incorporating micro theory to the macro theory that should be able to do
that (Snowdon & Vane, 2005, p. 21). In the following sections, I will describe how the
New Keynesian economics grasp the assumption of rationality, wage and price rigidity,
expectations, and the state of the economy.
Keynes did not use the assumption of rationality in his work as he did not find it
to be the correct explanation of the behavior of individuals. This meant that he did not
think people base their current consumption on predicted future income and that they act
based on lifelong-utility maximizing bases. Such consumers are called hand-to-mouth
consumers, meaning that the primary determinant of their current consumption is their
current income. On the other hand, those economists assuming the existence of rational
consumers argued that people are aware of the future cost of current government
spending and that they will consider as more of a loan than a transfer and will not spend
14

the money right away but will keep for future expenditures. The empirical research
showed that they are both partly correct; there are both types of consumers in the
economy. And that is what the New Keynesian Theory predicts, as we can see, for
example, in the work of Charles, Dallery, and Marie (2015). Such an assumption leads to
different fiscal-policy implications. In an economy, where there are both types of
consumers, it is not enough to spend more government money and assume positive
impacts and a higher multiplier, but other considerations have to be accounted for. When
dealing with hand-to-mouth consumers and "rational consumers", it is crucial to direct
the spending effectively. Hand-to-mouth consumers will increase their current spending
if they receive additional funds, while "rational consumers" will not. Therefore, for a
higher multiplier, the spending should be aimed at the consumers who will act on it
immediately, not save it for future tax expenditure or spread this additional income over
future periods.
Another difference between Keynes and (New) Classical is the existence of wage
and price rigidity. Keynes did not see the markets as perfectly competitive markets with
clearing prices, but he assumed the existence of rigidities. Using the traditional
Keynesian cross or IS-LM approach, we can see that the Keynesian theoretical
framework assumed fixed nominal wages and prices. This has the effect of a higher
multiplier as the initial spending will not have the effect of higher inflation, and therefore,
people will enjoy lower real prices and a higher real income. The New Keynesian
economics accept this assumption to a certain degree; however, they attempt to come up
with a microeconomics base for a slow adjustment of wages and prices (Snowdon &
Vane, 2005). Traditional Keynesian models see the reason behind the output fluctuations
15

as the inability of nominal wages to adjust. After the criticism of these assumptions, early
new Keynesians tried to explain where this rigidity comes from. Fischer (1977) and
Taylor (1980) introduced nominal rigidities in the shape of long-term wage contracts. In a
modern economy, wages are generally set ahead of time for a certain period. To Fischer
and Taylor, this showed the existence of nominal wage rigidities that would have the
power to affect the economy and suppress the effects of monetary policy. However, their
explanation did not possess a great microeconomics foundation; instead, they used the
explanation of a "revealed preference" for long-term contracts as frequent changes carry
disadvantages such as uncertainty. In his model, Fischer accepts the assumption of
rationality which is also included in the wage negotiations as the negotiators have rational
expectations about inflation and form nominal wage increases to equal expected inflation
in order to maintain a constant real wage. However, as Fischer shows in his model when
there is a negative, nominal demand shock, the aggregate demand will go down while the
nominal wages remain fixed and that will lead to a decrease in output in the short run
which is where monetary policy comes into effect. Fischer shows that as long as the
monetary institutions can manage the aggregate demand by increasing the money supply
quicker than the event of wage renegotiations, they can redirect the economy back to its
initial point by increasing the money supply. In general, we can see that in Fischer's and
Taylor's framework, the assumption of the neutrality of money (no effect on real values
such as real wage or prices, only nominal values) does not stand in the short run,
however, with the introduction of monetary policy in following stages, things return to
the initial point, and the real values remain constant in the long run as even anticipated
monetary policy action has real effects since it is based on the information that becomes
16

available after the contracts have been negotiated. Nevertheless, there were two main
problems with the explanation of fluctuations through nominal wage rigidities. First,
these explanations were missing a solid microeconomics underpinning. The second
problem was the countercyclical character of real wages. In Fischer's model, the increase
in employment through monetary expansion happens due to the decrease in real wages,
which was disregarded by Mankiw (1990). In his later work, Mankiw (1991) used this
finding to say that the sticky wages model did not work. He stated that if indeed
contractions in aggregate demand were connected to higher real wages, then they would
be ‘quite popular'. This conundrum led him to turn his focus to nominal rigidities in the
goods and services market rather than the labor market. This shift of interest is where the
New Keynesian started to differentiate themselves as they turned their attention to
imperfect competition (Rotemberg, 1978). In imperfectly competitive markets, firms stop
being price takers as the changes in price will affect their sales and profits based on the
price demand elasticity, and they will attempt to find the optimal level. However, such a
process can be hindered by the existence of, what Rotemberg (1978) called, the “PAYM
insight” (Snowdon & Vane, 2005, pp. 372-376). The idea behind the PAYM insight is
that the private cost to the firm of nominal price rigidities is much greater than the one to
the entire economy. These nominal rigidities are also called "menu costs". Menu costs
include a variety of costs connected to the change in prices such as the cost of new
menus, catalogs or renegotiations with suppliers and customers. Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987) show that the entire economy experiences a different impact from the nominal
price rigidities from an individual firm as price rigidities affect the aggregate demand
externality since the society would benefit from a universal decrease in prices; however,
17

there is no private incentive to do so. Under perfect competition, a nominal demand
shock would lead to firms lowering their prices all around the economy. Such move
lowers the marginal cost for all the firms, and they would be satisfied to sell for a lower
price which once again leads to a lower marginal cost, and the economy would go back to
its initial state as the real balances increased and therefore, the aggregate demand
increases. However, when including price rigidities using the menu costs, such nominal
demand shock will cause fluctuations as the decrease in nominal demand will not be
counteracted by the decrease in prices. Another issue that Mankiw and Romer (1991)
analyze are real rigidities. They see such rigidities as a magnifier of the impact that
nominal rigidities might have. As Snowdon and Vane (2005, pp. 378-380) present in their
work, we can present this on an example. Let us assume that the money supply declines.
Such move would normally lead to a decrease in prices by the firms, however, due to the
existence on menu costs and nominal price rigidities, it does not happen, and therefore,
this will then be followed by a decrease in real output. Since the aggregate declines, firms
do not have use for as many workers as before, and hence, the demand for labor
decreases. Assuming the supply of labor is relatively inelastic, the real wage will decline
as the nominal wage decreases, which in transfer lowers the marginal cost. This would be
counteracted due to an upward-sloping character of the marginal cost curve as firms
would have a greater incentive to reduce their; nevertheless, that is not the case if the
price demand elasticity falls after the decrease in demand. In such a case, firms' incentive
to lower prices is indirectly correlated with the fall in demand elasticity.
We also can find different sources of real rigidities in the New Keynesian
framework such as judging quality by price, capital market imperfections or customer
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markets where customers do not search for prices as frequently compared to the
frequency of their purchases and therefore, firms will not risk changing their prices very
often an increase in price will be immediately noticed, and customers will look elsewhere
while a decrease in price will not gain as much traction. To summarize, the New
Keynesian economics differentiate themselves from the traditional Keynesian economics,
New Classical economics, Monetary economics, and others by the way they handle the
issue of rigidities. Firstly, they took a step away from the explanation of fluctuation
through wage rigidities and turned to price rigidities. Secondly, they created a
microeconomic foundation for their arguments of price rigidities to show their real
impact in the short run with a slow return to equilibrium. In the process of the return to
the equilibrium, they also found a seat at the table for the effects of monetary policy.
The assumption of expectations goes hand in hand with the assumption of
rationality and therefore, the outcomes for the size of the multiplier from Keynes’ theory
and (New) Classical relating to the assumption of expectations are similar to the ones
coming out of the assumption of rationality. Keynes’ expectations are based on the notion
of animal spirit while the New Classical economists work with rational expectations
which will lead to a high Keynesian multiplier while the New Classical multiplier will be
low. When it comes to the New Keynesian economics, there is a general assumption of
adaptive expectations, however, adaptive expectations are generally not as strong as the
(New) Classical rational expectations. This can lead to different-sized multipliers,
depending on the strength of the assumption, but commonly, the New Keynesian
multiplier will be lower than for the Keynesian framework and higher than the Classical
framework.
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The research on the effects of the state of the economy on the multiplier has been
a popular topic recently due to the events of 2008. Nevertheless, it is something that even
Keynes and others dealt with. Keynes agreed that if the economy is at its potential,
additional government spending can have the effect of crowding out private investment,
but he also argued these leakages can be overcome by monetary policy actions also, due
to the fact that the economy is generally not at or above its potential which leads to a
higher marginal propensity to consume and therefore, commonly, government spending
has a positive impact (Keynes, 1936, pp. 119-120, 124) (Spencer & Yohe, 1975).
Friedman and others did not see it that way as they focused on the long-run impacts and
claimed that government spending will always be dampened. The New Keynesian
economics predicts a higher multiplier during downturns and lower multiplier during
expansions by combining these two arguments (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012)
(Thomakos, 2012) (De Cos & Moral-Benito, 2013). Along with dealing with downturns
and expansions, there is always the question of zero lower bound. The New Keynesian
economists accept the argument that monetary policy has the power to lower the size of
the multiplier by making fiscal policy ineffective through higher interest rates. However,
this does not apply for the periods of zero lower bound and fixed interest rates when the
monetary policy cannot counteract the fiscal policy, and during such times, the multiplier
should be higher.
In conclusion, the New Keynesian economists argue that there is not only one
multiplier, but there are different multipliers depending on circumstances. This can be
seen in their framework, as well, as it reflects the actual research that I will talk about in
the next section.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
For many decades when the mainstream theory was dominated by the
Neoclassical, New Classical, Real Business Cycle and Monetarist theories, fiscal policy
was seen as a tool with little use when it came to affect the national economy. The
consensus was that fiscal actions taken by the governing body would be offset by
monetary phenomena. That all changed when the Great Recession hit the global economy
in 2008, and interest rates dropped to zero. This development of events led the
economists and policymakers to turn to a more traditional tool of controlling the
economy: fiscal policy. Ever since the academic sphere has seen a rapid increase in the
interest in fiscal policy and its effects on the economy and a big part of this debate is over
government spending multipliers.
For Keynes, this was proof that the government should intervene through
increased spending when the economy is to face downfall. This debate has come a long
way since, nevertheless, a clear consensus is yet to be found. Such consensus would bring
a more unified approach to fiscal policy around the globe and a more effective tool how
to handle government spending and therefore, it is essential to look at what the research
has brought so far. This section will be divided into three categories, state-independent
multipliers, cyclical multipliers, and zero lower bound.
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3.1 State-independent Multipliers
In the early stages of the research into the fiscal multipliers, the models were
generally not profound enough to differentiate between different states of the economy.
One of the first economists to study this was a Harvard economist Robert J. Barro.
Barro's first work on government spending multipliers dealt with the impact of
government spending on the output and real interest rate (Barro, 1981). Using defense
spending as the shock variable, he concludes that it is true that temporary shocks to
defense spending create a sizeable temporary response; however, he does not find any
long-term positive benefits as there is a more of a dampening process than a multiplying
one. In another work, Barro and Redlick (2011) once again employ defense spending as
the shock variable, but this time, they use Ramey's narrative approach and land with
different results. The narrative approach is a method to identify an endogenous change in
a variable. In this case, Ramey created a series from news found in the newspapers about
unanticipated changes in defense spending. After analyzing US annual data, including
WWII, they find that contemporaneous defense spending leads to a multiplier of 0.4-0.5
while permanent spending will yield multipliers higher by 0.1-0.2. Nevertheless, Barro
and Redlick still find no evidence for the multiplier to be higher than unity. It is essential
to say that Barro's results are influenced by his inclination to Ricardian equivalence.
Barro, as a New Classical economist, includes the assumption of perfect rationality in his
work that dampens the size of the multiplier through the channels of consumption
smoothing and forward-looking behavior. The assumption of rationality is a complicated
issue as, on one hand, it offers a simple explanation for the representative agent;
however, it does not allow for incorporating the heterogeneity of society and its agents.
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One of the most critical works on the topic of fiscal multipliers is by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). In their work, Blanchard and Perotti are one of the first ones to use the
Structural Vector Auto Regressive (SVAR) method to analyze the impact of fiscal policy
on the economy. SVAR, unlike traditional VAR, can include assumptions. Blanchard and
Perotti take a dataset set in the US ranging from 1960 through 1997. They find them
multiplier to be higher than unity. Despite the great importance of their work, Blanchard
and Perotti use straightforward theoretical assumptions that can be disputed. They use
Cholesky decomposition by incorporating government spending, output, and net taxes in
that order. This ordering reflects their theoretical assumptions where government
spending is not directly affected by output as it takes more than a quarter for the federal
government to respond to a change in output. The output is affected by government
spending immediately since it is an automatic increase in GDP, while net taxes are not
affected by either right away. This a debatable issue as one could say that this model is
too simplistic and does not reflect the nature of expectations or monetary policy. Another
issue with their model, as pointed out by Ramey (2016), is the way they transform
elasticities to multipliers. I will talk about this in greater detail in Chapter 5; however,
such transformation as used by Blanchard and Perotti leads to an overestimation. Gali et
al. (2007) find similar results in his work when he looks at the US from 1948 to 2003. In
the late 2000s, the fiscal policy research started applying a new model called the New
Keynesian - Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (NK-DSGE). DSGE models have
the advantage over VAR models that they are heavily based on theoretical assumptions
which means that there can be no argument over the causation between two variables,
unlike VAR models that generally only shows us the correlations between the followed
23

variables. Nevertheless, what can be described as an advantage can also be looked at as a
flaw of these models as all the predictions from these models as being a reflection of the
theoretical and political background of the person or institution that created the model
(discussed in Chapter 4.1) . One of the pioneers of this approach was Forni in 2009 who
applied the NK-DSGE model on the US quarterly data from 1980 to 2005. He found that
the most significant impact lies with direct transfers to households. Another important
work was done by Zubairy (2014). Zubairy looks at the US economy and estimates both
government spending multipliers and tax multipliers. She finds that the government
spending multiplier is the largest on impact at 1.07. Such results support the notion of
government spending increasing private expenditure.
We can see that using linear models. The multiplier is generally lower than unity;
however, it depends heavily on the implemented assumptions and shock variable.
3.2 Cyclical Multipliers
As the proficiency of econometric methods progressed, researches started to be
able to estimate multipliers over different states of the economy. This was a significant
breakthrough to understand how fiscal policy affects the economy at different times. In
this section, I will present some of the most critical works on this topic.
In more recent years, some of the most impactful works came from Alan Auerbach and
Yuriy Gorodnichenko. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko used RSVAR in their work
(Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012). The RSVAR model is a variation of SVAR that can
follow changes between recession and expansion. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko used this
quality to estimate the multiplier in the OECD countries between 1985 and 2010 and
found that the multiplier is high during recessions, 2.3, and low during expansions, close
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to zero. Their recession multipliers are influenced by their handling of the recession
periods as pointed out in Ramey and Zubairy (2018). In their work, they put forward an
assumption that from the start of a recession period, such a recession will go on for 20
quarters. However, that is rarely the case that a recession would last precisely 20 periods;
therefore, their estimates can be biased due to the imperfect handling of transitions
between recessions and expansions. Similar results using RSVAR can be seen by
Thomakos (2012), 1.32 in recession and near zero in expansion, or De Cos and MoralBenito (2013), 1.4 during recession and 0.6 during expansion. Another influential work
comes from Ramey and Zubairy (2018). Ramey and Zubairy both focus on the size of the
multiplier during different stages of the economy. In their work, they use Jorda's local
projections to estimate the multiplier in the US during recessions, expansions, and zero
lower bound. They find that the multiplier remains constant and lower than unity over all
states of the economy. Their explanation why that is so is that government spending
crowds out private investment through higher interest rates, and at the same time, import
and export decrease. Ramey and Zubairy use narrative defense spending as their shock
variable to avoid heterogeneity. This method is undoubtedly a viable method to estimate
the effects of defense spending on the domestic economy, nevertheless, the main interest
should be in the effects of regular government spending as it has a closer connection to
the actual economy and the estimates of defense spending are generally lower than the
estimates of public investment, for example. Ramey is also one of the few economists
who, despite finding the zero lower bound multiplier to be lower than unity, admits after
analyzing estimates from different economists, that there is solid evidence that the
multiplier is indeed higher than unity, as can be seen in Ramey (2016). Bauer, Poplawski25

Ribeiro, and Weber (Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, & Weber, 2012) use nonlinear threshold
VAR (TVAR) to show how the multiplier different over different states of the economy.
They use the dataset from G7 countries except for Italy and find that the multiplier is
usually positive and smaller than unity, however, that does not always have to be the case
if there is a significant output gap. Such findings go along with the Keynesian and New
Keynesian framework. Due to using datasets from multiple countries, they can compare
the estimates between different economies. They find that the US has a multiplier greater
than unity, 1.7 after the first four quarters, during a period of the negative output gap,
while Canada and the UK have a small multiplier, lower than unity. Their use output gap
is a vital piece of the puzzle as the existence of an output gap points towards a higher
multiplier which reflects in their work.
Overall, economists generally agree that the multiplier is smaller but positive
during expansions, but higher than unity during the recession. Next, I will look at the size
of the multiplier during zero lower bound periods.
3.3 Zero Lower Bound Multipliers
DSGE models can accommodate different states of the economy, which
economists used to analyze the size of the multiplier during Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)
periods along with more traditional VAR models. One of such works was written by
Gauti B. Eggertson (2011). Eggertson, in his work, estimates the size of the multiplier
during zero lower bound periods. He models an economy with insufficient demand and
zero interest rates, and an economy during regular periods. During normal periods
(sufficient demand, interest rates higher than zero, and non-zero capital), he finds that the
multiplier is around 0.5. However, once he constrains the economy with ZLB,
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insufficient demand, and zero capital, he finds that the multiplier reaches the heights of
2.3. Comparable work was done by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011). They
also assume no capital during ZLB and get similar results to Eggertson. Their mutual
explanation goes along with the New Keynesian theory stating that during non-ZLB
periods, the existence of a negative output gap would be followed by a decrease in
interest rates which would lead to eliminating the gap. ZLB makes such move
impossible, and therefore, fiscal policy becomes more effective. These two models are
influenced by the theoretical assumptions Eggertson made about ZLB, insufficient
demand, and zero capital. The existence of insufficient demand and zero capital will
boost the size of the multiplier as the new inflow of federal money into the economy will
be used to get the economy back to its equilibrium.
The research shows us that the multipliers are, in fact, higher than unity during
zero lower bound periods, just as the theory predicts.
3.4 Multiplier after the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
The Great Recession of 2008 was a great tragedy to the American and world
economy, causing a massive drop in employment rate and national GDPs. Nevertheless,
for economists interested in the fiscal and monetary policy, this event offered an excellent
opportunity to analyze these forces. In this section, I will talk about the Great Recession,
how it affected the economy, then I will focus on the fiscal response from the Obama
administration, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and what we have
learned about the multipliers from during the following years.
During the 2000s, the US economy was doing as good as ever with a steady
growth rate, low unemployment rate, and general optimism about the future. This lasted
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until December 2007 when the economy was hit by the crash of the housing market.
During the following two years, the US economy lost more than 7.5 million jobs, and
households around the US lost around $16 trillion of net worth due to the drop in the
stock market. This represented a hard test for, at that point, incoming President Barack
Obama. Unlike many European countries that decide to with austerity plans, the Obama
administration decided to stimulate the US economy by increasing government spending
in addition to some unconventional monetary policies (called quantitative easing). This
resulted in the creation of the ARRA that came into effect in 2009 and had the goal of
providing American households and businesses with more income. The plan was to spend
an additional $787 billion, which was later increased to $831 billion, on health care,
infrastructure, direct transfers, education, and tax provisions (Amadeo, 2018). All the
data can be seen in Table 10. Along with the expansionary fiscal policy, the Federal
Reserve (Fed) that was run by Ben Bernanke from 2006 to 2014 decided to respond to the
downturn by lowering the overnight interest rate to the proximity of zero. When
comparing the characteristics of the ARRA and theoretical frameworks talked about in
Chapter 2, we can see that this policy was based on the Keynesian ideas, which naturally
caused many controversies that are still going until now. Next, I will look at the literature
that has looked at the effects of the fiscal policy following the Great Recession.
In her work, Ramey (2019) analyzes how fiscal policy research has developed
after the Great Recession, the changes in methodology and theoretical understanding.
Ramey shows the crucial differences that came with modern research techniques and
frameworks. In terms of theoretical aspects, Ramey shows how the New Keynesian
economics and models include both sides, the Keynesian approach focusing on the
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demand side and the Classical approach focusing on the supply-side channels. Along
with theoretical aspects of the research, Ramey shows how the methodology has evolved.
She describes that thanks to the development of econometric techniques, the researches
have been able to capture the dynamic and interconnect character of the multipliers and
other variables through the improvement in the SVAR models and DSGE models. As an
example, she shows the ability to include fiscal frictions or the new way to transform
elasticities of government spending and GDP to actual multipliers. In terms of actual
estimates, Ramey after studying related works finds that the average multiplier is
between 0.6 and 1; however, it can be higher depending on the circumstances such as the
exchange rate regime, type of government sending or the state of the economy.
Next, let us look at individual examples of works estimating the multiplier after
the Great Recession. From the Keynesian theoretical standpoint, the multipliers should
have been relatively high during the periods after the Great Recession and the
implementation of the ARRA. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) followed the development
around European countries and found that the countries that decided to implement
significant fiscal consolidations went through a slower growth than the IMF predicted.
Such a result points to the underestimation of the multipliers and concludes that the
multiplier must have been higher than one during these years. On the other hand, Alesina,
Favero, and Giavazzi (Alesina, Favero, & Giavazzi, 2012) after analyzing the multipliers
around different OECD countries found the multiplier to be low and constant regardless
of the state of the economy. In terms of the impact of the ARRA, there were multiple
studies on the size of the multiplier during the recovery, and following years, however,
there is no substantial evidence that the multiplier was as high as the federal government
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expected. First, I will show the estimations from the Congressional Budget Office and
International Money Fund, and then we will look at the works from independent
researchers.
The CBO has released multiple reports on the estimates of the multipliers
resulting from the ARRA spending and transfers. The latest one was published in 2015,
covering the period from 2009 to 2014 (Congressional Budget Office, 2015). In their
work, they use evidence from models and historical relationships to estimate the size of
the multiplier for different types of spending. In their model, they include both direct and
indirect effects of the initial shock by using estimates from macroeconometric forecasting
models, direct estimation using historical data, and other relevant research. As the
estimates of indirect effects and relationships that have an impact have a clear connection
to the assumptions we make about these relationships, the CBO includes a range of
results that reflect differing opinions on the magnitude of these relationships and how
they affect the size of the multiplier. They find that government purchases of goods and
services yield multipliers between 0.5 and 2.5, transfers to local and state governments
for infrastructure lead to a multiplier between 0.4 and 2.2, transfers to local and state
government for other purposes end with a similar multiplier, 0.4 and 1.8, transfer
payments to individuals 0.4 and 2.1, and one-time payments to retirees are estimated to
be between 0.2 and 1.0. After all, they conclude that despite short-term multipliers being
reasonably high, their 2015 work shows that the long-run effects will cause a slight
decrease in the output (0 – 0.2), but no adverse effects on employment. The issue with
their modeling is the reliance on assumptions laid on the relationships between variables.
The CBO uses historical evidence and theoretical research to assign parameters to these
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relationships and then create a range based on different theoretical priors. It ends up with
ranges being over 2 points, which does not necessarily give us much information about
the actual size of the multiplier.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is another institution that has been dealing
with the issue of the multiplier after the Great Recession. In the work of Spilimbergo,
Symansky, and Schindler (2009), they analyze different mechanics of estimating the
multiplier and look into its characteristics. They recognize the importance of the country,
time, and circumstance specifics. They use regression analysis and find that the low set of
multipliers is 0.3 on revenue, 0.5 on capital spending, and 0.3 on other spending. The
higher set of estimates is 0.6 on revenue, 1.8 on capital spending, and 1 for other
spending. Nevertheless, they do acknowledge that these multipliers might be
underestimated because of the lack of data that leads to attenuation bias. In a similar work
published by IMF from Batini, Eyraud, Forni, and Weber (2014), they analyze the
estimates from various papers and find the multiplier to average about 0.75 in advanced
economies during regular times, while when analyzing the economy during downturns,
the multiplier gets higher. They also create a model to estimate predicted multipliers for
different countries based on their characteristics using proxies such as how open the
economy is, the rigidity of the labor market, government debt, and others. Using this
model, they find that the multiplier for the US during normal times should be between 1.0
and 1.4. Their model can be beneficial for low-developed countries where the data is not
available on such scale as in the developed countries. Their estimates for these countries
can be used for improving the local fiscal policy; however, more testing is needed to be
done to see whether these estimates stand worldwide and under any circumstances.
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When looking at the work of independent researchers, the government spending
multiplier rarely exceeds unity for aggregate national data as can be seen in Cogan
(2010), Drautzburg and Uhligh (2015), however, that changes when the focus is turned to
the cross-state data. Feyer and Sacerdote (2011) employ both types by analyzing the
impact of the ARRA on job creation through cross-sectional regressions and time series
regressions and then transforming these results into multipliers. They find the multipliers
to be higher when looking at the aggregate data at 0.47 compared to 1.06. The highest
multiplier can be found for transfers to low-income households (2.31 national, 1.96 crossstate) while the lowest is for teachers and police spending (-0.71, -3.31). In their work,
Feyer and Sacerdote estimate state-level estimates and then transform their results to the
national level. This is also called an "aggregation problem". Unfortunately, it is not as
simple to take state estimates and transform them as the entire economy faces different
circumstances such as federal debt, exchange currency, net export, federal output gap,
and others. Therefore, their cross-state estimates can be seen as valid, but one has to their
national estimates with a pinch of salt. Another work was done by Oh and Reis (2011)
that focused on the effects of government spending and tax transfer as the response to the
Great Recession. They created a model that included both the neoclassical assumption of
wealth effects and Keynesian assumption of the impact of lower-income households and
their increased demand. The wealth effect refers to transfers of money from high-income
households to low-income households. As the marginal worker pays more in taxes than
receives in transfers, a higher transfer will decrease the wealth of the marginal worker,
which will force them to increase their labor supply. Their estimated multiplier is very
low for government spending, 0.06. We could discuss the treatment of the assumptions
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implemented. The implementation of New Classical assumptions could lead to erasing
the effects of the Keynesian channels and therefore, lead to a multiplier low such as this
one. Chodorow-Reich (2019) put together a survey of the works dealing with the crossstate effects of the ARRA and found the mean to be 1.8. He then goes on to argue that the
cross-state multipliers are merely lower bounds for the national multipliers when the
economy is facing a liquidity trap. A liquidity trap is a situation when the economy is
facing low interest rates and high savings rates, which make the monetary policy
ineffective. In such a case, people will rather hold on to their savings instead of investing
in low-return bonds. Therefore, the ARRA multipliers, he argues, were probably even
higher than 1.8. In her work, Ramey (2019) argues against this conclusion as she finds
Chodorow-Reich answering the wrong question. Ramey says that since Chodorow-Reich
is assuming per capita values for government spending and employment and therefore,
she concludes that his findings only represent the additional employment in the average
state following the ARRA, but they do not answer much aggregate employment was
created through it due to the possible heterogeneity in the treatment effects. Therefore,
assuming national multipliers through cross-state multipliers can be misleading and
overestimated. Then she goes on a uses Chodorow-Reich’s replication data but weights
by initial population data and uses overall government spending, not only transfers and
purchases directed to local and state entities, and finds that even using his model, and
finds the multiplier to be lower than unity at 0.9.
Overall, the evidence points to the fact that the government spending multipliers
were not higher than unity during the years following the Great Recession despite the
theoretical framework pointing to such a conclusion. One explanation can be due to the
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mishandling of ZLB periods. The mainstream assumption is when the economy is facing
zero interest rates during these times, that should mean that fiscal policy would be more
effective due to the constraints on monetary policy. However, Swanson and Williams
(2014) argue that this does not apply when looking at 1-year and 2-year treasury bonds as
the yields on them were relatively unconstrained from 2008 to 2010, and therefore,
monetary policy would have the capacity to counteract the effects of any fiscal stimulus
the movements of interest rates.
Along with their criticism, we can also turn to Palley (2016) to see that the ZLB
periods do not necessarily have to reflect on the economy as they are supposed to
according to the mainstream theory. I will talk about this issue more in Section 4.2.
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Chapter 4: Impact of Methodology and Theoretical Assumptions
The differences between the theoretical frameworks are apparent. The Keynesian
and New Keynesian approach assumes that the multiplier will be positive and more
significant than unity. On the other hand, the New Classical economists would say that
the multiplier will be positive; however, it will not be greater than unity. These outcomes
result from differing assumptions included in their models that result in these
conclusions. However, that does not explain why there is often time a disagreement
between two economists from the same school or how such assumptions directly affect
empirical research. In Section 4.1, we will go over how the methodology can affect the
estimations of the multiplier through the choice of model, shock variable, etc. In Section
4.2, I will create a connection between the theoretical framework, its assumptions, and
how it directly affects empirical research and its results.
4.1 Choice of Methodology
Macroeconomists and econometricians have, for a long time, been struggling to
identify the right model to use to when analyzing the effects of fiscal policy. Currently,
we can find three main models that are used to do so. Macro-econometric forecasting
models, time series models, and DSGE models. All of them have their pros and cons, as
well as they are better suited for different situations, datasets, and variables. In this
section, we will compare time series models and DSGE models, and how they affect the
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estimates of government spending multipliers. Next, we will look at the choice of the
shock variable.
Time Series Models
When talking about time series models in relation to fiscal policy and government
spending multipliers, what is usually meant is the vector autoregression model (VAR).
VAR models serve to capture correlations between variables over time. In their general
form, they do not require any theoretical background, which makes them relatively
simple to work with and not affected by false assumptions. Their weakness is that
without such theoretical assumptions, it can be hard to assess the direction of causation
between the variables of interest (identification problem) as well as their sheer reliance
on the past which can be misleading if circumstances have changed. To tackle this issue,
a large group of economists uses Structural VAR (SVAR) that allows making
assumptions about the interaction between variables.
DSGE Models
A DSGE model is one of the latest inventions in the fiscal policy analysis and has
been heavily used to capture its effects. DSGE models are based on the assumptions
about people's decisions of how much to consume, save, work in relation to prices, taxes,
wages, etc. Their advantage is that there can be no confusion about the relationships
between variables as the theoretical backing offers a clear explanation. The underlying
assumptions can differ, but traditionally, modern models include the assumption of the
economy, including both rational and hand-to-mouth consumers, and limited expectations
and information. This translates to the issue of consumption optimization as consumers
are not capable of optimizing their consumption over their lifetime due to the limits on
36

the previously mentioned assumptions. Hence, if the theory stands, there is no problem,
however, once the theory is flawed, so are the estimates. Compared to VAR and SVAR
models, DSGE models are especially useful under a new set of circumstances where
VAR and SVAR models would not yield accurate estimates due to their reliance on the
historical data. DSGE models also offer the advantage of a great differentiation between
the New Keynesian and New Classical theory. Generally, DSGE models offer higher
multiplier, however, as Reichling and Whalen (2012) show in their work, the estimates
for time series models range from 0.3 to 3.5 and from 0.5 to 2.25 for DSGE models. That
being said, it would be false to assume that the differences between estimates would be
due to different models.
Despite the popularity of DSGE models, there has been a criticism of their use.
Paul Romer (2016) focused on the issue of the use of econometrics in macroeconomics
and took a better look at the use of DSGE models. He goes back to Lucas (1976) who
influenced the modeling in economics with his critique and Romer says he agrees with
him that there is a theoretical divergence in economics that translates into the research
and affects it. For Lucas, it was the inclusion of parameters based on historical data that
does not include the new information that would change the model. Romer sees a similar
problem in the use of more modern DSGE models where economists predetermine the
relationships between variables and the strength of these relationships according to their
premise. He sees this as economists abandoning the scientific part of economics and stick
to their theoretical assumptions. However, he disagrees with what the models brought
after Lucas' critique. He points to the Great Recession that was not predicted by DSGE
models and said that the real failure of economics was that the mainstream models were
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blindfolded and could not predict such a serious event. The issue of the DSGE model
being reliant on assumptions can be seen in the work by Carlin and Soskice (Carlin &
Soskice, 2007, pp. 606-609). The evolution of the NK-DSGE model has been a complex
one as through the addition of assumptions of rational expectations and technology
shocks to the Neoclassical growth model, the Real Business Cycle model was introduced
and after that by including money, imperfect competition in goods market and sticky
prices it turned into the NK-DSGE model. The traditional NK-DSGE model works a
flexible price equilibrium, however, unlike the Real Business Cycle due to the
introduction of imperfect conditions in the goods market, this is not the first best
equilibrium that can be only achieved by removing the imperfections. Also, real rigidity
in the goods market implies the fact that the economy is not at its first best equilibrium,
however, there is no involuntary unemployment. The implementation of sticky prices has
the effect that (inefficient) shocks will produce equilibrium cycles around the (inefficient)
flexible price equilibrium which will lead to an underemployment and a room for
stabilization policy. Therefore, one can see that by using the NK-DSGE model, the
empirical research itself is suddenly constrained by a number of assumptions that will
have an effect on the size of the multiplier (as discussed in Chapter 4.2)
In summary, DSGE models brought a more dynamic character to the modeling in
economics; however, one has to be cautious with their use as their estimates will be
heavily influenced by the predisposed assumptions and biases from the researchers.
Shock Variable
The shock variable carries great importance to it as it lets us identify the
government spending shock we are trying to follow. As Ramey (2016) describes in her
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work, there are three main types of shocks: the one used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
where they order government spending first through Cholesky decomposition; a narrative
military news shock as can be seen in (Ramey & Zubairy, 2018) where they find
unexpected military spending by following news articles; and lastly, Ben Zeev and
Pappa’s (2017) defense news shock using medium-run horizon method. Ramey replicates
the same methodology with the exception for shock variable to test how each one of
those three will perform. After eight periods (quarters), Ramey finds that Blanchard and
Perotti's shock variable yields the lowest multiplier (0.39, Ramey's yields (0.8), and Zeev
and Pappa's is the greatest at 1.41. This clearly shows us that the choice of shock variable
can have a major impact on the estimates.
When discussing these three types of shock variables, the main concern was the
identification of the shock. However, that is not the only issue that economists face.
Another problem is that every single type of government spending has a different impact
on the economy. A part of the government spending multiplier research has focused on
the difference between government consumption multiplier and government investment
multiplier. Ilzetzki (2013) found that government investment multiplier is greater than
unity, while the government consumption multiplier is smaller.
4.2 Choice of Theoretical Assumptions
As described in Chapter 2 and its subsections, the New Keynesian and New
Classical frameworks differ on many levels, which reflects in the models. In this
subsection, we will look at what the assumptions are that are generally included in the
models, and how they affect the size of the multiplier.
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Type of consumers
Two types of consumers can be assumed, Ricardian (rational) or Rule-of-thumb
(Hand-to-mouth) consumers. Ricardian consumers follow their permanent income rather
than their current income, and every increase in government spending will lead to them
saving more money as they expect to pay more in taxes in the future. Rule-of-thumb
consumers follow their current income, and if that goes up due to increased government
spending, they will increase their consumption. This differentiation plays a considerable
role when it comes to estimating the size of the multiplier. If our model includes the
assumption of all consumers being Ricardian consumers, the multiplier will be close to
zero or zero as the additional will not be spent but saved. However, if everyone in our
model is a hand-to-mouth consumer, we will get a multiplier greater than unity. In recent
days, econometric models can accommodate both to be a better representation of the
economy, as shown in Charles, Dalley, and Marie (2015).
State of the Economy
Another critical assumption is about the state of the economy and the reaction of
all agents. Firstly, there are different ways to identify the state of the economy and use it
for the following analysis, as shown in (Ramey & Zubairy, 2018), which can lead to
different estimates. However, if we look away from this issue, then there is a need to
make assumptions about the behavior of people during downturns and expansions.
Downturns can affect consumers' confidence, marginal propensity to consume, and they
can also affect financial markets and their willingness to lend money. All these things
have to be taken into effect and included in the model’s assumptions as they will affect
the size of the multiplier.
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Expectations
Expectations are connected with the assumptions of rationality as it is assumed
that consumers are forward-looking and predict what is going to happen based on
publicly available information. The assumption of expectations generally lowers the size
of the multipliers as people can get better prepared and smoothen their consumption. For
example, if consumers expect a decrease in government spending, they will lower their
consumption now by a small amount so that the shock is not that major in the future and
vice versa.
Monetary Policy
As has been shown in recent years, the conduct of monetary policy is of the
utmost importance. There are commonly two main assumptions that can be made. Either
the monetary policy follows the Taylor rule, or it is constrained (e.g., ZBL). Taylor rule is
an approximation of the movements of nominal interest rate to changes in inflation,
output, and other variables (Taylor J. , 1993). In the case of monetary policy following
the Taylor rule, any action taking from the side of fiscal policy will be counteracted by
monetary policy. For example, if government spending goes up, so will the interest rates
which will lower consumption and investment. On the other hand, sometimes the central
bank decides to keep interest rates constant, for example, during the Great Recession. In
such a case, since the interest rate cannot move, the government spending will not alter
with them and can have a full impact on the economy, which will lead to a higher
multiplier. Such results when the interest rate is assumed to be fixed can be seen in
Woodford (2011).
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However, there has been a debate about whether our understanding of Zero Lower
Bound or even negative interest rates is, indeed, correct. In his work, Palley (2016)
disputes this notion. Krugman (1998) was the first one to introduce the concept of Zero
Lower Bound to the New Keynesian economics as he analyzed the stagnation of the
Japanese economy in 1991. His model is based on a traditional macro model that assumes
consumers and firms rationally arriving at the equilibrium level of wages, prices, and
interest rates. However, when the market is in excess supply, and the interest rate is
constrained due to the zero lower bound, the level of output will have to adjust to the
aggregate demand, not the other way around as flexible interest rates would allow. This
leads to a leftward movement along the aggregate demand curve, lowering the quantity of
goods demanded, and therefore, the output decreases. In the loanable funds market, both
the supply and demand for goods will shift to the left due to the reduction in output that
causes a decrease in private savings and investment. In a typical case, the central bank
would direct its nominal interest rate to be equal to the targeted inflation rate plus the full
employment (natural) interest rate; however, that does not work when the natural interest
rate is negative, and the nominal rate is constrained by ZLB. This framework has been
used many times to explain the occurrence of stagnation, but Palley (2016) disagrees on
an empirical and theoretical basis. Regarding the empirical portion of his critique, he
shows that since 2011 even during ZLB periods after the Great Recessions, the nonfinancial business debt in the US has been increasing fairly fast, as well as the household
debt since 2012. Nevertheless, that does not correspond with the story told by Eggertson
and Krugman (2012) who in their work claimed that the natural interest rate was pushed
down by consumers and firms paying back their debt and deleveraging which then led to
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an excess in supply of loanable funds as the nominal interest rate was constrained by
ZLB and could not reach the level of natural interest rate. He also criticizes the notion put
forward by Krugman (2005) where he claims the global economy is in a saving glut,
especially due to excess of savings in China. The supply of Chinese savings would, in
such case increase the export of Chinese goods to the US, which brings along the increase
in the supply of loanable funds and lowers aggregate demand in the goods market. In
such a case, depending on the size of the glut, this might lead to a negative full
employment interest rate that might not be achieved due to ZLB. However, Palley points
out a couple of inconsistencies. Firstly, most of the Chinese export is produced by firms
owned by foreign entities or joint-ventures. Therefore, the export schedule has more to do
with global arrangements rather than their saving patterns. Secondly, he takes an issue
with the notion that the increased export of Chinese goods will increase the supply of
loanable funds in the US. He shows that these goods are financed by American banks
who lend money to American consumers. He then criticizes the "neoliberal" policies that
led to the financial crisis and ZLB periods by showing how the high and lows of the
interest rate kept decreasing during business cycles from 1981 to 2010. As he notices,
with every business cycle, the low of the interest rate kept getting closer to zero, and he
states that the periods of zero lower bound that occurred after the financial crisis in 2008
were nothing but a product of these policies that was long in the making. From the
theoretical standpoint, he disagrees with Krugman (1998) who labeled ZLB as a liquidity
trap. He takes an issue with the fact that liquidity trap only occurs when money and
bonds are perfect substitutes which, as he states, is not correct since quantitative easing
had the power, in the past, to alter the bond prices which would not have happened if
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people were indifferent between money and bonds while the central bank would be
exchanging money for bonds. Another point he takes an issue with is the idea that if the
central banks did indeed decide to turn to negative nominal interest rates, then the private
investment would go up and spur the aggregate demand. He says that might not be the
case as the firms might decide to hold onto the money and their non-produced assets.
During low-interest periods, the firms will turn from equity financing to loan financing as
it is cheaper and will return the equity to the shareholders. They will also reduce their
money holding as the return is low and will increase investment and holdings of nonproduced goods. In times of a negative nominal interest rate, firms might even turn to
complete loan financing through share buybacks to repay their shareholders. The issue
comes when the marginal efficiency of investment becomes zero as the firms will rather
turn non-produced assets such as cash, investment commodities, patents, and others, and
will greatly decrease their investment activities. Therefore, firms will rather spend money
on existing assets rather than investing in the production of new ones. Palley also
disagrees that lowering the nominal interest rate has to lead to an increase in private
consumption. He points out that even though the opportunity cost is lower as the interest
rate decreases, people also receive a smaller income through the interest payments and
when looking at negative interest rates, people experience a drop in their wealth which
leads to lower savings and lower consumption. This, in turn, decreases the aggregate
demand and output.
Another issue with monetary policy is its dependence on the state of the economy.
Even though monetary policy is often used as an exogenous regressor, there is a clear link
between the rate of growth and the actions of the monetary institutions. As an example,
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we can imagine a growing economy where the main concern is to avoid overheating of
the economy. In such a case, the central bank will be increasing interest rates to avoid
overspending and, using Austrian terminology, malinvestment. This will last until the
economy experiences a downturn in which case, the interest rates will be lowered to
support private consumption and investment. Hence, monetary policy is procyclical.
Nevertheless, to analyze the government spending multipliers, this does not represent a
fatal problem.
Overall, the mainstream economics tells us that the lower the interest rates, the
higher the private investment and consumption; however, as Palley shows, that does not
necessarily have to be the case.
Nominal and Real Rigidities
A big part of the Keynesian and New Keynesian framework is the assumption of
price and wage rigidities. The New Classical theory and models tell us that additional
government spending will lead to inflationary forces, which will increase nominal prices
and nominal wages, therefore no change in real variables. On the other hand, the New
Keynesian models include the assumption of the change in nominal prices and wages not
to occur right away. In practice, that means that additional government spending
increases the nominal income of consumers while nominal prices do not have the time to
adjust right away, which leads to a higher real income. This will, in conclusion, lead to
higher consumption and a higher multiplier in the short run.
As we could see in Section 2.3, there are differences in the understanding of
nominal and real rigidities between the (New) Classical, traditional Keynesian, and the
New Keynesian theory. Based on the assumptions that are included where the New
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Classical theory assumes immediate adjustment to changes and shocks in the economy
and therefore, there is no place for rigidities, the Keynesian and New Keynesian theory
does work with rigidities, however, from a different standpoint. The Keynesian theory
works with fixed nominal rigidities in their framework, focusing mainly on the rigidities
in the labor market. The New Keynesian theory, following the work of Mankiw (1991),
turned to the nominal rigidities in the goods market where they assume rigidities in the
short run that are counteracted, mainly by the monetary policy, in the long run. The
conclusion for the size of the multiplier varies based on which theory we decide to use. In
the New Classical framework, the size of the multiplier would be smaller as the nonexistence of rigidities would not allow the economy to be outside its equilibrium and
therefore, there would be no changes in real income and wealth that would lead to higher
private consumption or investment. On the side of the New Keynesian rigidities, there is
more room for a higher multiplier; however, due to the inclusion of rationality in their
framework, the multiplier would diminish over a longer period. The traditional
Keynesian economics framework assumes fixed rigidities, and as Keynes (1936)
predicted in his work, nominal rigidities can be an option for the economy how to
increase its consumption, investment, and output in general. Therefore, for the Keynesian
theory, the inclusion of rigidities means a chance for the multiplier to be high.

46

Chapter 5: Methodology
5.1 SVAR
To analyze the size of the government spending multiplier during the period after
the Great Recession, I employ an SVAR model based on the methodology used by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and later on, I make certain adjustments to this model and a
different transformation to get the multiplier. I also estimate the multiplier for the entire
economy and then for the economy without the FIRE industries. First, I will explain why
I chose to follow Foley’s work (2011), and then I will describe how the SVAR model
works in theory, and lastly, I will present the variables I included and how they affect the
model.
The SVAR model is a simple approach into estimating the impact of shocks as
they analyze the historical relationships between variables without the need for an
abundance of theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, they do have a couple of issues.
SVAR models might reflect the impact of omitted variables which can bias our estimates.
Secondly, they are susceptible to identification restrictions, as shown in Uhlig (2005).
The choice of identification has been criticized as economists choosing the identification
to find appropriate results that go along with the theoretical priors.
In his work, Foley (2011) argues based on the classical framework that there are
unproductive industries such as FIRE that inflate the calculations of GDP. As mentioned
in Chapter 1, the FIRE sector's value added is not based on universal measures as are the
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remaining industries, but their value added is imputed to equal their income (wages and
profits) and the difference between interest received and interest paid. However, there is a
direct relation between these variables and sales; therefore, the connection between
aggregate demand and the imputed value added is likely to be small. He finds the
measurement that does not include these industries to capture the state of the economy
more accurately and shows how the entire economy went through a less severe recession
compared to the economy without FIRE industries. Following his findings, I create a
variable that captures the value added without FIRE industries and shows the real impact
of the fiscal policy and a more accurate estimation of the size of the multiplier.
My first specification of the SVAR model is
(4)𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿, 𝑞)𝑌𝑡 − 1 + 𝑈𝑡

Y is a three-dimensional vector of Tt. Gt, and X where T represents net taxes, G stands for
government spending and X is the output. All three variables are transformed into real,
per capita values, and logarithmic. As we will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section, all three variables are quarterly series to capture and identify the government
spending shock. Ut represents a vector of the reduced-form residuals of the
aforementioned variables. A(L,q) is a four-quarter distributed lag polynomial in order for
the lagged coefficients to depend on the selected quarter that is aligned with the
dependent variable. My second specification of the SVAR model brings a slight twist on
the work done by Blanchard and Perotti by including a log of the difference between the
10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate and the 3-year Treasury Constant Maturity
Rate. I will call this variable “interest rate”. The reasons will be explained in the next
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section. However, that changes the specification by turning the vector Y t into fourdimensional vector, including the interest rate, and same goes for the vector Ut.
One of the greatest issues in how to estimate the spending multiplier is the identification
of the government spending shock. I follow Blanchard and Perotti by assuming that any
government spending not predicted by the lags of other variables represents an exogenous
shock.
(5) tt = a1xt + a2etg + ett
(6) gt = b1xt + b2ett + etg
(7) xt = c1xt + c2gt + etx
ett, etg, etx represent uncorrelated shock that I am trying to recover. Equation (4) shows
that all unexpected movements in net taxes are due to the unexpected change in output,
a1xt, unexpected shock to government spending, a2etg, and structural shock to taxes, ett.
The same structure applies to the following equations where government spending
responds to unexpected changes in output, taxes, and government spending shocks, and
changes in output depend on unexpected changes in government spending, taxes, and
other shocks, etx. I assume that government spending is not automatically affected by
changes in output within the first quarter and therefore, b1 = 0. To determine the
coefficient a1, I use the elasticities of government spending and taxes to output and
employ the following equation.
(8) a1 = 𝑎1 = ∑𝑖 𝜂 𝑇𝑖 ,𝐵𝑖 𝜂𝐵𝑖 ,𝑋
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𝑇𝑖
𝑇

𝜂 𝑇𝑖 ,𝐵𝑖 represents the elasticity of taxes of type i to the tax base and 𝜂𝐵𝑖 ,𝑋 is the elasticity of
tax base to the output. I estimate the remaining coefficients in a similar fashion by
running a regression of xt on gt and tt.
After recovering these parameters through regressions, I move on to estimate the
impulse response of the output to a government spending shock by employing both types
of the specification and later by implementing the value added without FIRE industries to
analyze the real impact of government spending. I run an SVAR with one-quarter lag
with Cholesky ordering as I assume that the federal government is not able to notice a
change in output, pass new legislation and implement it in order to alter government
spending with one quarter. Cholesky ordering sets theoretical restrictions on the model as
the way I order the variables will create relationships between them. My first
specification is government spending, output, net taxes in that order. Such specification
means that output is not affected by output or net taxes with the first quarter, the total
output is only affected by government spending, and net taxes are not affected by either.
In the second specification, I keep the first three variables and order interest rate last. In
the third specification, I order government spending first, value added without FIRE
second, and net taxes last. Now that I have parameters for all my variables, I can estimate
the impulse responses by employing an impulse response function. The estimates from
the impulse response function are, however, only elasticities to government spending
shock; therefore, I have to transform those values to get the multiplier. I do so by dividing
the log change in GDP with the log change in government spending and the average ratio
of government spending to output. Ramey (2019) criticizes the way Blanchard and
Perotti transform their estimated elasticities as they lead to larger, more cyclical
50

multipliers, therefore, to show the difference, I also employ their way of transforming
elasticities. Blanchard and Perotti's transformation captures static multipliers as they only
employ the initial elasticities of government spending. I employ the largest elasticity of
government spending to the government spending shock to capture a long-run multiplier
that captures its size with better accuracy. Ramey also points out the problem in using the
ratio of government spending and output as it substantially differs over time; however,
this issue is not relevant to my work as I work with a small sample where the mean is
0.18, the low 0.17, the high 0.19 and the median 0.18.
5.2 Data Description
In this work, I use quarterly data spanning from Q1 in 2009 to Q4 in 2018. The
fact that I follow such a recent period allows me to use data directly from government
sources that do not need to be extrapolated, such as they would for certain historical
periods. The series consists of nominal gross domestic product, real gross domestic
product, nominal government spending, real government spending, federal government
receipts, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity,
and population. The real values for GDP and government spending are derived by
applying GDP deflator using the 2012 chained American dollar value.
To obtain nominal and real government spending and GDP, I use the data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA tables. NIPA tables offer both nominal GDP and
real GDP along with the GDP deflator. When it comes to government spending, I include
all federal, state, and local purchases and then subtract transfer payments. After that, I
apply the GDP deflator to end up with real values for government spending.
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To get the 10-year Treasury Constant: Maturity Rate, I use St. Louis FED database. I
employ the monthly data following the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2Year Treasury Constant Maturity and then derive their quarterly average. For the
population variable, I use quarterly data estimates from the same database.
5.3 Data Analysis and Context
The period between 2009 and 2018 was profoundly affected by the events of
2008. In 2008, the American and global economy was struck by a financial crisis that led
to what is now called the Great Recession. Following the breakdown of the mortgage and
eventually the entire financial system, the virus spread into every single part of the
economy and paralyzed it for some time. Next, I will present data that will help us
understand the early periods of the followed time frame, how the economy got on the
road of recovery and ended with one of the most prolonged periods of growth in
American history. I will also talk about how these events affect the size of the multiplier.
Let’s start by following the GDP.
As said before, the years following the Great Recession had many issues to them,
however, the recovery lead to a growth that started with Q2 in 2009 and has not stopped
since for a single quarter. That is if we are looking at the nominal GDP values. However,
as any Basic Economics textbook says, the vital information lies with the real values. To
get the full picture, I will also employ the population series to get the real GDP per
capita. Figures 1 presents the real GDP per capita development over the 40 quarters that I
follow. We can see that the economy went through a rather steady growth that,
nevertheless, had minor setbacks over time.
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To take a better look at individual quarters and their growth, I derive a series
following the percentage growth rate of the real GDP per capita. Figure 2 shows us how
the quarterly growth looked like over the years. We can see that out of the forty quarters,
only eight of them experienced a drop in real GDP per capita, and seven of the eight were
in the first five years after the Great Recession, after 2014, the economy experienced only
one such drop. What does that mean for the size of the multiplier? Generally, expansions
are supposed to result in smaller multipliers; however, one could argue that due to
damaging effects of the financial crisis, the American economy was, at least in the first
couple years, below its potential. If that is the case, the output gap, according to the
Keynesian theory, leads to high multipliers as the factors in the economy are not fully
utilized, and therefore, additional government spending would not generate the
“crowding out” effect. And that is, indeed, the case. As we can see in Table 11, the US
economy had not reached its potential until 2018 Q2. This could be suggestive of a higher
multiplier than the pure assumption of expansion would predict.
Now, let us move on to the issue of government spending. As said before, the
government spending series is derived by including all federal, state, and local
expenditure and subtracting transfer payments. During the darkest days of the financial
crisis, the Obama administration passed a bill called the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009. This act was supposed to increase government spending
between 2009 and 2019 by $787 billion, which was subsequently adjusted to $831
billion. Even though a substantial part of this fiscal stimulus package revolved around tax
incentives and transfers, a considerable chunk of the money went to infrastructure
investment, housing, research, and similar expenses, as can be seen in Table 10. This
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increase can be seen, especially when looking at the early quarters after the crisis when
real government spending per capita increased by more than 5% in 2009 only (Figure 3).
After the initial increase in government spending, the levels of it begun to decrease again
to its previous heights. Nevertheless, such movements in government spending give us an
option to analyze it better. As mentioned in Section 4.1, different types of government
spending have different effects on the multiplier and significant part of the fiscal stimulus
over the years was government investment which theoretically should lead to a higher
multiplier as it not only supplies additional money into the economy, but it also directly
creates new values and increases productivity.
The unemployment rate is something that goes hand in hand with the state of the
economy and generally has a negative correlation with the growth of GDP. This can be
seen in Figure 4 as the US faced unemployment of over 9% at its peak in 2009 Q4 and
over time, this rate dropped to less than 4%. Concerning the size of the multiplier, the
idea is similar to the one when I talked about the output gap. Higher unemployment
means underutilized capacities, and hence, the additional money supply in the economy
would lead to an increased private spending and consumption and the multiplier should
be higher during the periods of the high unemployment rate. This would mean that the
multiplier was high during the first couple of years of our sample and decrease over time.
There has been much research on the issue of interest rate, zero lower bound, and
the government spending multiplier. I talked about some of the most critical works on
this topic in Chapter 2, so I will not go over the issue again from the purely theoretical
perspective, but let's look at how the interest rate behaved over the followed years. The
Federal Reserve System was run by three different people over the time frame, Ben
54

Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and Jerome Powell. Ben Bernanke, as the Chair of the Federal
Reserve, along with the Board of Governors, decided to do what had not been done that
many times in US history. Lower the interest rates to direct proximity of zero. The
thinking was that such a move would spur private investment and spending and help to
get the economy back on track. At the same time, such a move theoretically can increase
the effectiveness of the fiscal policy. Zero lower bound maintained its status quo until
2016 when FED that was run by Janet Yellen at that point decided to start progressively
increasing the rates, and the same strategy is still being used. When connecting this
information to the size of the multiplier, once again, the story sounds the same. During
the initial years, the multiplier should be higher as the interest rate is low and get smaller
over time with the increases in interest rate. It is essential to point out that I use the 10Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, as seen in
Figure 5. The reason I do so is following Swanson and Williams (2014), who said that the
1-year and 2-year treasury bills were unconstrained from 2008 to 2010. For my results, it
is optimal that the regime does not change as my model is not capable of differentiating
and secondly, long-term investments are often based on long-term interest rates, and
therefore, the inclusion of both interest rates will capture better the interest rate that is
used as the rationale for such investments.
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Chapter 6: Results
As mentioned, I will estimate three different multipliers three different
estimations. The first one, as done by Blanchard and Perotti, includes real values of
government spending, net taxes, and GDP, the second one expands the variable list by
including the interest rate, and the third one uses real government spending, net taxes,
and value added without the FIRE industry. I do not use a regime-switching model;
therefore, I will present linear multipliers. I will show three estimates for all
specifications, the initial shock, after eight periods and after 20 periods to see the initial
impact, short-run multiplier, and long-run multiplier. All the estimates are cumulative
multipliers for the given period and can be found in Table 3.
According to the theory and literature, as presented in Chapters 2 and 3, I assume
that the multiplier will be lower than unity as there has not been substantial evidence
towards a multiplier higher than one after the Great Recession. The theory would dictate
that the multiplier should be higher during these years since the US economy was facing
zero overnight interest rates, however, as Swanson and Williams (2014) show in their
work, the interest rates were not constrained during the first years after the recession
when the most forceful spending occurred. The works that found the multiplier to be
higher than unity mostly focused on different types of government spending such as
investment or employed cross-state models. Since I do not follow either of those
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methodologies, the multiplier should be in line with Ramey's findings (2019). A different
story could unfold when looking at the impact of government spending on the added
value without the FIRE industries. Following a Classical-Keynesian line of thinking,
Duncan Foley (2011) differentiates between value-creating or productive sectors of the
economy and unproductive ones. Having identified the Finance Insurance Real Estate
(FIRE) industries as unproductive ones, he demonstrated that the severity of the recession
was deeper than the official measures once the unproductive sectors (the FIRE) excluded
from GDP calculation. The inclusion of the FIRE industries inflates the value of GDP
and in turn, makes the recession look less severe. With the multiplier, such occurrence
could lead to a higher multiplier as the spending will be directly used for production and
consumption.
First, I employ the Blanchard-Perotti (BT) SVAR specification. I order my
variables through Cholesky decomposition in the following order: government spending,
GDP, net taxes. My results show a multiplier with the initial impact of 2 in the first
quarter, going down to 1.6 after eight quarters, and after 20 quarters (5 years), the
cumulative multiplier is 0.5. This shows that government spending is effective in the
initial quarters, but over time, it diminishes and drops below unity. This goes hand in
hand with the current research as well as the estimates from the CBO, as described in
Chapter 3. When using BT transformation, Ramey's criticism seems valid as the
multiplier is higher at every single period. All the results can be found in Table 4.
When employing my extended version of the BT specification where I included
an interest rate that is ordered last, I find that the multiplier is slightly higher than during
when not included. The initial impact is 2.8, after eight periods it is 1.3 and lands at 0.9
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after 20 periods. This points to the fact that despite the monetary policy not being
constrained, there was friction in the money market that allowed the fiscal policy act in a
greater manner than it would have without it. After transforming using the BT
transformation, I once again get a higher multiplier.
Lastly, I employ the BT specification, but I use value added without FIRE
industries instead of GDP to assess how the government spending affected these
industries. My findings follow what was implied by Foley in his work, government
spending multiplier is higher without FIRE industries in calculations. I find the impact
multiplier to be 2, similarly to overall economy, however, after 8 periods, the multiplier is
2.3 and after 20 periods, it is 1.7. This finding shows that not only the state of the
economy, type of spending or methodology affect the size of the multiplier, but a simple
choice of which industries receive the money makes a great difference as the multiplier
reflects the creation of value and in turn income.
In summary, my results confirm what was to be assumed based on the chosen
assumptions, methodology and previous research. The overall cumulative multiplier was
not higher than unity after 5 years, zero lower bound had an effect on the size of the
multiplier but not as great as could be assumed from the theory and the direction of
spending makes a difference.
Importantly, when testing the model, using the first specification, I cannot reject
the null hypothesis that states that government spending has no effect on the output,
however, for the remaining specifications, I can reject it and say that the government
spending has an effect on the output.
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Conclusion
After the Great Recession, the interest in the effects of fiscal policy has picked up
speed and that showed in the number of papers and reports written on the size of the
government spending multiplier. A greater insight into such complicated subject would
be of great help not only to push the economic theory forward, but also to improve the
handling of government funds and how they should be spent. This debate has been going
on for decades since the modern macroeconomics originated, from Keynes to Friedman
to Barro, Ramey, Krugman and many others, however, a clear conclusion has never been
made. This is due to multiple factors such as simple theoretical background that leads to
different sized multipliers, the choice of the spending shock, methodology, or practical
things such as timing, type of the spending and its direction.
Based on this unclarity, I decided to put together a summary of main theoretical
frameworks dealing with government spending and how the agents in the economy
respond to it. I show that the main assumption affecting the size of the multiplier is the
assumption of rationality as it dictates whether people will spend the additional income in
the same or following period, or whether they decide to smooth their consumption over
future periods which decreases the size of the multiplier. To compare the theoretical and
empirical world, I do a review of some of the main works on this topic and I find that
SVAR models generate higher estimates than the DSGE models. The reason is that the
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DSGE models are based on theory and the modern New Keynesian theory combines both
New Classical and Keynesian assumptions.
Regarding the empirical analysis in this study, I follow up on the traditional
specification by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and expand it by adding interest rate and
different transformation of elasticities to multipliers. Here, I test whether my results will
be similar to theirs due to the similarity in models and whether Ramey’s remarks over the
false BT transformation are appropriate. I find that even when applying modern data, my
results are fairly similar to the ones by Blanchard and Perotti, high impact multiplier that
decreases slightly below unity. By adding interest rate in the model, I test the assumption
of a higher multiplier during constant, low interest periods. I find that the multiplier is
indeed higher than unity as theory would presume, but not by as much as some of the
works would say. Lastly, I test the impact of government spending on the added value of
all the sectors without the FIRE industries. I find that the government spending multiplier
is higher for the overall economy once the unproductive sectors such as FIRE, as called
by Foley (2011) are excluded. Foley’s analysis along with the multiplier analysis shows
that the unproductive segments of the economy must receive and consume some of the
income generated by fiscal policy and the multiplier process. Once we take the
unproductive sectors out of the equation, we can see the real size of the generated income
and the multiplier process.
The research on this topic still has a long road ahead. For example, the type of
government spending is another issue to deal with. It has been shown that there are
certain types of spending such as investment or transfers that produce higher multipliers,
however, it has not really been looked into which sectors of the economy benefit from it
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the most. Regarding my work, it would be beneficial to expand the data set in order to
tighten the confidence intervals and also, possibly implement a regime-switching model
and make certain assumptions about the output gap.
In my work, I showed the differences in theoretical approaches and how they
affect the size of the multiplier. Then, I showed how economists and researchers dealt
with this topic using their models and assumptions. Last, I create my own model to test
whether my results will be similar to the original model to show how important the
methodology and assumptions are for the results and then I expand it by adding two new
variables, interest rate and value added without the FIRE industries. My results indicate
that methodology is, indeed, one of the main factors regarding the multiplier and so is the
choice of variables.
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Figures
Figure 1 Real GDP per Capita
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Louis Civilian Unemployment Rate [UNRATE]
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Figure 3 Real Government Spending per Capita
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Figure 5 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
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Figure 6 Impulse Response, Estimation 1
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Figure 7 Impulse Response, Estimation 2
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Figure 8 Impulse Response, Estimation 3

76

Figure 9 Cumulative Multiplier, Specification 1
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Figure 10 Cumulative Multiplier, Specification 2
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Figure 11 Cumulative Multiplier, Specification 3
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Tables
Table 1 Aggregate Multipliers by Models and Linearity
Author

Methodology

Linearity

Country

Results

(Blanchard &

SVAR

Linear

US

Spending

Perotti, An

Multiplier = 0.9

Empirical

to 1.29

Characterization
of the Dynamic
Effects of
Changes in
Government
Spending and
Taxes on
Output, 2002)
Barro and

Time Series

Linear

US

Redlick (2011)

Temporary
Multiplier =
0.4-0.5
Permanent
Multiplier =
0.5-0.6

(Gali, Valles, &

SVAR

Linear

US

Spending

Lopez-Sallido,

Multiplier =

2007)

0.78-1.74
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(Forni,

NK-DSGE

Linear

Euro Area

The biggest

Monteforte, &

impact lies

Sessa, 2009)

with direct
transfers to
households.

(Auerbach &

RSVAR

Non-linear

OECD

Recession

Gorodnichenko,

Multiplier = 2.3

2012)

Expansion
Multiplier ≈
0

(Thomakos,

RSVAR

Non-linear

Greece

2012)

Recession
Multiplier =
1.32
Expansion
Multiplier ≈
0

(De Cos &

RSVAR

Non-linear

Spain

Recession

Moral-Benito,

Multiplier = 1.4

2013)

Expansion
Multiplier ≈
0.6
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(Ramey &

Jorda’s local

Zubairy, 2018)

projections

Non-linear

US

Recession and
Expansion
Multiplier = 0.6
ZLB multiplier
= 1.5 (at its
peak with
certain
specifications)

(Baum,

TVAR

Non-linear

Poplawski-

G7 without

Negative

Italy

output gap =

Ribeiro, &

1.7

Weber, 2012)

Positive output
gap < 0 (US)

(Eggertson,

NK-DSGE

Non-linear

US

2011)
(Christiano,

Non-ZLB = 0.5
ZLB = 2.3

CNK-DSGE

Non-linear

US

Non-ZLB < 1

Eichenbaum, &

ZLB = 1.6 –

Rebelo, 2011)

2.3
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Table 2 ARRA Multipliers by Cross-state Dependency
Author

Cross-state focus

Results

(Congressional

National

Purchases of Goods and Services =

Budget Office,

Aggregate

0.5 – 2.5

2015)

Transfers to State and Local
Government for Infrastructure = 0.4 –
2.2
Transfers for other purposes = 0.4 –
1.8
Transfers to Individuals = 0.4 – 2.1
Onetime Payments to Retirees = 0.2 –
1.0

(Cogan, 2010)

National

Spending Multiplier = 0.6 – 0.7

Aggregate
(Drautzburg &

National

Spending Multiplier = 0.5

Uhlig, 2015)

Aggregate

(Feyrer &

National

Aggregate Multiplier = 0.47

Sacerdote, 2011)

Aggregate and

Cross-state Multiplier = 1.06

State-Cross

The biggest impact lies with transfers
to low-income households
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(Oh & Reis,

National

Aggregate Multiplier = 0.06

2011)

Aggregate

(Chodorow-

National

Aggregate Multiplier > 1.8

Reich, 2019)

Aggregate and

Cross-state multiplier > 1.8

State-Cross
(Ramey, 2019)

National

Aggregate Multiplier= 0.9

Aggregate and
State-Cross
(Batini, Eyraud,

Model-based

Spending Multiplier = 1.0 – 1.4

Forni, & Weber,
2014)
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Table 3 Cumulative Multiplier, Own Results
Specification #

OIRF

BT Transformation

Specification 1

Initial shock = 2.0

Initial shock = 2.9

After 8 quarters = 1.6

After 8 quarters = 2.3

After 20 quarters = 0.5

After 20 quarters = 0.7

Initial shock = 2.6

Initial shock = 3.7

After 8 quarters = 1.3

After 8 quarters = 1.9

After 20 quarters = 0.9

After 20 quarters = 1.3

Initial shock = 2.0

Initial shock = 3.0

After 8 quarters = 2.3

After 8 quarters = 3.5

After 20 quarters.= 1.7

After 20 quarters = 2.5

Specification 2

Specification 3
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Table 4 VAR Specification 1

86

Table 5 Granger Causality Wald Test Specification 1

87

Table 6 VAR Specification 2

88

Table 7 Granger Causality Wald Test Specification 2

89

Table 8 VAR Specification 3

90

Table 9 Granger Causality Wald Test Specification 3
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Table 10 ARRA expenditures, initial estimates
ARRA ($
billions)
Relief for Families

$260

Health Care

$138

Education

$117

Infrastructure

$83

Small Businesses

$54

Alternative Energy

$22

Science Research

$18

Other

$95

Source https://www.thebalance.com/arra-details-3306299
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Table 11 Output Gap
Quarter

Output Gap

2009q1

-875.70

2009q2

-948.80

2009q3

-940.90

2009q4

-818.10

2010q1

-799.70

2010q2

-698.00

2010q3

-624.20

2010q4

-588.20

2011q1

-675.20

2011q2

-614.70

2011q3

-673.50

2011q4

-547.20

2012q1

-481.00

2012q2

-474.50

2012q3

-517.80

2012q4

-566.70

2013q1

-492.30

2013q2

-542.70

2013q3

-486.00

2013q4

-426.70
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2014q1

-540.90

2014q2

-405.70

2014q3

-276.00

2014q4

-270.30

2015q1

-205.00

2015q2

-139.50

2015q3

-174.70

2015q4

-234.10

2016q1

-243.00

2016q2

-217.60

2016q3

-206.80

2016q4

-202.70

2017q1

-197.10

2017q2

-138.60

2017q3

-88.70

2017q4

-64.40

2018q1

-48.40

2018q2

48.90

2018q3

108.30

2018q4

111.70
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Table 12 Full Estimates for Elasticities and Multipliers, Specification 1
Specification

Elasticity

Elasticity

OIRF

BT

1, periods

G on G

G on Y

Multiplier

Multiplier

0

0.193535

0.353435

2.0253013

2.92147435

1

0.188572

0.336137

1.97336459

2.84655623

2

0.217053

0.401301

2.271412

3.27648628

3

0.150139

0.50682

1.57117168

2.26639748

4

0.172373

0.457428

1.80384561

2.60202701

5

0.19193

0.481427

2.00850532

2.89724635

6

0.141597

0.480663

1.48178153

2.13745319

7

0.16852

0.434563

1.76352481

2.54386471

8

0.152939

0.42826

1.60047307

2.3086644

9

0.131993

0.393706

1.38127777

1.99247766

10

0.140747

0.356056

1.47288646

2.12462216

11

0.115139

0.331666

1.20490436

1.738061

12

0.107724

0.291629

1.12730802

1.62612914

13

0.103148

0.259659

1.07942118

1.55705292

14

0.085464

0.229956

0.894362

1.29010713

15

0.082487

0.196584

0.86320835

1.24516834

16

0.073709

0.170797

0.77134851

1.11266155
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17

0.064228

0.144897

0.67213192

0.96954274

18

0.06104

0.120961

0.6387702

0.92141883

19

0.053174

0.101533

0.55645424

0.80267898

20

0.048343

0.082536

0.50589888

0.72975345
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Table 13 Full Estimates for Elasticities and Multipliers, Specification 2
Specification

Elasticity

Elasticity

OIRF

BT

2, periods

G on G

G on Y

Multiplier

Multiplier

0

0.226417

0.330158

2.57069464

3.65880549

1

0.244052

0.298869

2.77091901

3.94377983

2

0.267629

0.365147

3.03860768

4.32477444

3

0.196288

0.467135

2.22861583

3.17193325

4

0.208547

0.451832

2.36780213

3.37003365

5

0.171737

0.453641

1.94986854

2.7751992

6

0.138623

0.427334

1.57389862

2.2400906

7

0.161276

0.375394

1.83109638

2.60615375

8

0.115008

0.330827

1.30577849

1.85848192

9

0.109859

0.250073

1.24731775

1.7752762

10

0.111016

0.189749

1.2604541

1.79397285

11

0.0717

0.116669

0.81406787

1.15864248

12

0.081364

0.030005

0.92379105

1.31480874

13

0.068446

-

0.77712259

1.10605918

0.62000863

0.88244279

0.032676
14

0.054608

0.108167
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15

0.065993

-

0.7492717

1.06641971

0.173078
16

0.053319

-0.22159

0.60537357

0.86161308

17

0.059876

-

0.67982047

0.9675715

0.77037843

1.09646038

0.73790654

1.05024396

0.90966692

1.29470621

0.272571
18

0.067852

0.301621

19

0.064992

0.322284

20

0.08012

0.334621

98

Table 14 Full Estimates for Elasticities and Multipliers, Specification 3
Specification

Elasticity

Elasticity

OIRF

BT

3, periods

G on G

G on Y

Multiplier

Multiplier

0

0.198945

0.353314

2.0126704

3.00416856

1

0.241024

0.33833

2.43837176

3.63958242

2

0.280879

0.407135

2.84157354

4.24141276

3

0.216893

0.524257

2.19424525

3.2751923

4

0.260371

0.472231

2.6340999

3.93173175

5

0.266474

0.489814

2.69584223

4.02389009

6

0.199898

0.483495

2.02231163

3.01855934

7

0.243811

0.433339

2.46656705

3.6816675

8

0.231446

0.418315

2.34147384

3.49494985

9

0.211271

0.37784

2.13736906

3.1902973

10

0.230657

0.33569

2.33349175

3.48303555

11

0.21

0.302455

2.12451071

3.17110457

12

0.205289

0.257793

2.07685085

3.09996612

13

0.204323

0.22014

2.06707811

3.08537904

14

0.189586

0.184078

1.91798804

2.862843

15

0.188299

0.148039

1.90496782

2.84340866

16

0.182215

0.118401

1.84341771

2.75153723
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17

0.17531

0.090382

1.77356178

2.64726829

18

0.17349

0.066173

1.75514935

2.61978539

19

0.168056

0.046065

1.70017511

2.53772928

20

0.164763

0.028302

1.66686075

2.48800334

100

